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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the portfolio behavior of investors differing with
respect to both tax rates and risk—aversion, emphasizing the role of constraints
on individual and firm behavior in ensuring the existence of and characterizing
portfolio equilibrium.
Under certain conditions on the securities available in the market, which
also are required for shareholders to be unanimous in supporting firm value
maximization, investors will be segmented by tax rate into two groups, one
specialized in equity and the other in debt. Though the relative wealths of
the two groups determines the aggregate debt—equity ratio, each firm will be
indifferent to its financial policy.
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1. Introduction
Our aim in this paper is to determine under what conditions there exists
an equilibrium aggregate debt-equity ratio, and, if such exists, to examine
its dependence on the risk preferences and tax rates of theinvestors in the
market. Miller (1977) has conjectured that even ifno optimal debt-equity
ratio exists for an individual firm, there will bean equilibrium aggregate
debt-equity ratio which will equal the relative wealth levels of those withtat
preferences for debt as opposed to equity. This is true, however,only in
special cases, and we examine a more general model below. Inparticular, we
shall highlight the critical role which constraints (on, forexample, personal
borrowing or short sales) play in the determination of the market equilibriumJ
The role of constraints when the tax sysem is non—neutralhas been discussed
by Black (1971, 1973), King (1974,1977) and Auerbach (1979).
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'In a footnote in hispaper, Miller (.cit.)alludes to the need for
some constraints but is not explicit about which consftaintsare necessary, and
his argument relies more on the capitalizationof tax differentials than the
role of constraints. In contrast, we shallargue that constraints are crucial.—2—
The behaviour of the aggregate debt—equity ratio is important for the
incidence of a corporation tax because the effects of such a tax depend on
firms' financial policies, and on the change in the capital structure of
the corporate sector resulting from a change in the tax. There appear to
be very few econometric studies relating the aggregate debt-equity ratio to
personal and corporate tax rates. In a study for the U.K., King (1977,
chapter 7) found that an increase of one percentage point in the rate of
corporation tax would lead to an increase of 1.5 points in the debt-equity
ratio for the nonfinancial corporate sector. For the U.S., Gordon (1980)
found that an increase in the rate of corporate income tax of one point
would lead to a rise in the debt—equity ratio of 0.97 points. The results
presented here provide a theoretical rationale for this relationship.
In Section 2 we present the basic model which adopts a simple mean—
variance framework. This allows us to compare ourresultswith those of
the standard capital asset pricing model without taxes, and affords an
explicit solution for market value which illuminates the role of taxes in
the model. The importance of the assumption is that we are considering a
model in which, in the absence of taxes, a firmisunable by altering its
debt—equity ratio to affect the implicit prices of contingent commodities
faced by its owners. Hence when there are no taxes the Modigliani —Miller
theorem will hold.2 We then investigate the introduction of taxes into such
a world. Ifafirm may influence the implicit prices faced by its owners
even when there are no taxes, then the capital structure of individual firms
2See the discussion in King (1977, chapter 5).—3—
will not be a matter of indifference and, in general, stockholders will
disagree over the choice of debt-equity ratio. In other words, the aim
here is to examine a model in which, if there were not taxes, both individual
and the aggregate debt-equity ratios would be a matter of complete indifference,
and we ask whether the existence of taxes leads to an equilibrium for either
the individual or aggregate debt-equity ratio.
Taxes were introduced into the capital asset pricing model by Brennan
(1970) and Gordon and Bradford (1979). Our contribution is to model the
supply of corporate securities and to examine the interaction between demand
and supply in a general equilibrium framework in which the interest rate
is endogenous.
Section 3 discusses the conditions under which an equilibrium debt-equity
ratio exists, and the optimal portfolios of different investors are examined
in Section 4. In Section 5 we show that, provided there exist constraints
of the appropriate type and there is a sufficiently large number of firms,
value maximization is an objective which would command the unanimous
support of the stockholders, and each firm would be indifferent as to
its debt—equity ratio. The Modigliani-Miller Theorem would hold even in a
world of distortionary taxes, but only if investors faced constraints.
Finally, we examine the optimal degree of specialization in portfolios by
pension funds and individual investors on their own account.—4—
2. The Model
We shall consider a two—period model with M investors and N firms.
Each investor has an intial endowment of shares in firms, denoted by
•We normalize such that 1
Vj (1)
Firms are assumed to have made production and financial decisions
before trading in financial assets takes place. The value (V) of each
firm is the sum of the debt (D) and equity CE) which it issues
V.= D.+E. (2) 1 1 1
Weshall ignore the possibility of bankruptcy.3 The debt of all
firms is, therefore, riskless, and investors are indifferent as to which
firms' debt they hold. There are no bonds in the initial state, and the
proceeds of bond issues are returned to the initial stockholders. We
may write the budget constraint of investors as
Dm +E' =wm= m=l...M
(3)
where Dm is investor m's holdings of debt, E'' is investor m's holding
of the equity of firm i = and wm is investor's wealth.
Investor preferences will be assumed to be characterized by a
utility function defined over the mean and variance of the terminal value
of his portfolio,
3Eankruptcy is modelled in Auerbach and King (1979)and Strebel (1980); since
the probability of bankruptcy is endogenous it is very difficult to analyze
models of this type when there are many firms because the returns to each
security are a truncated distribution.and C. .isthe covariance
1J
In the absence of a satisfactory theory of dividend
ferable to regard all equity income as being taxed at the
As we shall see below, constraints on investors play
role in determining whether or not an equilibrium exists.




If we denote by R the second—period return to corporate debt and by
t ,t,andt ,thetax rates on corporate income, personal interest income c P e
and personal equity income respectively, the mean and variance of investor





where is the mean pre—tax return to firmi
of the returns to firms i and j.
We have assumed here that investors face given tax rates which are
not a function of the level of income, and we shall discuss this further
in section 3. The tax on equity income represents an effective tax rate
based on the tax treatment of dividends and capital gains, and we shall
assume that
(7)




In turn, there are two sources of arbitrage which give rise to the need
for constraints. First, investors face different tax rates and have
different marginal rates of substitution between assets, Secondly, firms
and individuals have different tax rates producing an indentive to engage
in financial transactions to exploit this difference. The constraints
which we shall model will be the following. The first is a constraint on
personal borrowing, and for simplicity, we assume that investors may not
borrow at all.4
m — 0 Ym (8)
Secondly, we shall suppose that investors are unabletosell equity
short, and we will apply this constraint to an investor's total holdings
of equity and not to holdings in individual firms.
ET)0 Vm (9)
Finally, we shall impose a constraint on firms such that they may not
sell either their own or other firms' equity short, nor may they hold
negative amounts of debt
0 D. V. Vi (10)
1. 1
Ifwe attach multipliers ATandA to the constraints (8) and (9)
respectively, then we mayformthe Lagrangian
4it is trivial to include a fixed positive borrowing limit for each
investor.—7—
=u(m(cm)2) +X(Wm_E)÷ A (11)
Substituting (5) and (6) into (11), and assuming investors to be price-
takers, thea first—order conditiohs for utility maximization obtained by
differentiating with respect to each investor's holdings of equity in
5 each firm may be written as

















which measures an investor's tax
(1—tm)p preference for equity rather than
debt (indifference implies Tm 1) -
AmA m -A 1 2
-
5mesecond—order conditions are satisfied provided U is a concave
function of the equity holdings and a suitable constraint qualification
is satisfied.—8—
If we sumthefirst order conditions over individual investors we obtain
(p.—RDJA —RE.B=C. (13)
11 1 1 1
where A =yAm
=
C.=.c..,the covariance of the returns to firm i with
1 •J1J
thetotal returns in the economy.
If we now sumoverfirms we have






This gives the market interest rate as
p-sA (15)
1—fl (14)
The equilibrium interest rate is a function of the aggregate debt-equity
ratio unl?ss A =8,a condition to which we return below.—9—







Equation (16) is the capital asset pricing model adjusted for taxes
and heterogeneous investors. If A =Bwe obtain the usual valuation result
for a mean—variance model in that the value of the finn is simply the risk-
adjusted discounted flow of profits and is independent of its capital
structure. The necessary and sufficient condition for the value of a firm
to be independent of its debt-equity ratio is that A =B.6This is also
the necessary and sufficient condition for the riskless interest rate to
be independent of the amount of debt in the economy. An examination of the
conditions under which A =Bleads us into a discussion of the existence
of a market equilibrium.
6 . . . A The derivative of market value with respect to debt is 1 —which
reduces to the results of Modigliafli and Miller (1963) and Brennan (1970)
when there are no constraints and given their respective assumptions about
tax rates.—10—
3. Market Equilibrium
Before trading takes place we suppose that firms announce both their
production plans and the amount of debt which they willissue.Under what
conditions will an equilibrium exist, and when will there be unique market
values for firms which are independent of their debt-equity ratios?
Consider, first, the case of perfect certainty (when C.. =0v.). It is
clear from (12) that in the absence of constraints individual excess demands for
securities are unbounded, and hence no equilibrium exists, except in the
special case where all investors have values of unity for the tax preference
variable Tm. This will occur with either a comprehensive income tax or
a comprehensive expenditure tax, but will not be true of any tax system
that discriminates between different types of income from capital. Even
if investors have identical values for Tm but these differ from unity, no
equilibrium is possible unless constraints are placed on firms to prevent
tax arbitrage between the personal and corporate sectors. In this case
the equilibrium would be for the corporate sector to be all debt or all
equity depending on whether T1 was less than or greater than unity,
respectively. One route by which values of Tm might be equalized would
be for individuals with above—average values of Tmtoborrow from investors
with below—average values and, provided interest payments were tax—deductible,
to continue this process until marginal tax rates were equalized.7
7When equity income is viewed more realistically as a combination
of dividends and capital gains then in a multi—period model the individual
who borrows from other individuals is not necessarily the investor with
the highest personal tax rate (this is analyzed in King, 1977, chapter 6).—11—
There are, however, several objectives to this way of modelling
the equilibrium. First, it is rare for the marginal personal tax rate
to be a continuous function of taxable income, a property which is required
for the previous argument to hold. Secondly, some investors are "endowed"
with tax rates that are independent of the level of income; the obvious
example here is the existence of tax—exempt institutions. Thirdly, the
tax authorities will probably impose constraints to prevent the tax
avoidance which results from the creation of these personal loans.8 But
even if personal tax rates were to be equalized, only by chance would
this be at a value for the common Tm of unity. In general, the resulting
equilibrium would be one in which the corporate sector was all debt or
all equity.
An interior equilibrium aggregate debt—equity ratio for the corporate
sector can be obtained only by imposing constraints on individual investors.
If short sale constraints are imposed on both debt and equity (i.e. lending
between individuals is prohibited) then those investors who wish to hold
debt will have to hold corporate debt. In equilibrium the aggregate cor-
porate sector debt-equity ratio will equal the ratio of the wealth of those
investors with a tax preference for debt (TmC 1)to the wealth of those
with a tax preference for equity (T" >1).Note, however, that this re-
quires constraints to rule out personal borrowing. Where personal borrowing
is feasible it will in general be more profitable for highly taxed investors
to issue debt than for this to be done by corporations.
8See King (1974, 1977)— 12—
Exactlythe same considerations carry over to a world of uncertainty.
We shall assume that each firmis"small" relative to the market so that
a firm is unable to affect the implicit prices (i.e. the individual valua-
tions) of consumption in each state of the world. With this assumption
investors will wish firms to maximize market value. From (16) it is clear




When there are no constraints on investors, each firm will be either
> alldebt or all equity according to whether B <A,a condition which we
may interpret in terms of a "market" preference for debt orequity.9 As
in the case of certainty, the absence of constraints on investors leads
to an all debt or all equity equilibrium for the corporate sector.
If we now impose constraints on investors then the value of B becomes
a function of the endogenous multipliers corresponding to the con-
straints. when the constraints are binding an interior equilibrium will
exist in which A =B(provided the market contains some investors who have a
tax preference for equity and some with a tax preference for
debt). At this point there is an equilibrium aggregate
debt-equity ratio for the corporate sector, but each firm is indifferent
as to its own debt—equity ratio and market values are independent of debt—
equity ratios. The important point to note here is that two conditions are
required for the result. First, each firm must be small relative to the
market, and, secondly, constraints on individual investors are necessary
to produce an interior equilibrium for the corporate sector.
9
Weassume here constraints on firms to ensure existence of an equilibrium.—13—
4. Optimal Investor Portfolios
Given the existence of a market equilibrium, we may use the individual
first—order conditions for utility maximization (12) to solve for the
optimal portfolio of each investor. The results may be seen as a general-
ization of the special case in which there are no taxes and a separation
theorem dictates that each investor holds the same "market" portfolio
of equities. When individuals possess different "tax preferences" for
debt and equity, just as when their expectations differ, optimal port-
folios will vary, but in a way which may be explained intuitively.
Substituting (13) into (12), and using the fact that =
weobtain
n'!'C.. =3m[Cl —RD)(—.)] (18)
Stacking these conditions for each individual m yields:
=
Bm[r.4
+ - RID)(—.- )] V (19)
where
[c11.






Assumingthe variance—covariance matrix r is of full rank, we can multiply
both sides of (19) by F1 to obtain the vector of individual m's demands
for equity:—14—
m ml —l ,in
n=B f-+I'(ii— RD)(—.-—-—)] (20)
B B" B
m
In the absence of taxes, E1E, sothat individual m holds the same
Bm B
fraction of each firm's equity, !_thisis the separation theorem alluded
to above.
With taxes present, patterns of equity holdings will normally vary
across investors, although there are some special situations when the
separation theorem will still obtain. For example, if the ratio of mean
return received by equity, i —RD,relative to covariance with the
market, C, is some constant a for all firms, (20) reduces to
nm =Bm[!+ -A)].1 (21)
B Bm
It is interesting how (21) combines the results for investor equity demands
which derive from the simpler models in which either taxation or uncertainty
is ignored. The relative influence of the two terms in brackets on the
right—hand side of (21) depends on a, which measures how risky the market
is.If the amount of undiversifiable risk is large, andsmall, then
demands approximately resemble those derived in the absence of taxes.
On the other hand, when risk is slight and a large, investors approach the
certainty outcome of being specialized in either equity or debt, according
to whether Tm is greater than or less than
10
10 m
To see this, recall that Tm= Aexcept where investor inisspecialized
in one type of security.—15—
The reason why individual portfolios will differ in the presence
of taxes may be understood by considering first the special case where
firm returns are independent (I' is diagonal), and (20) becomes:
n=B[!+i)(_)] V (22) 1 B B" B i,m
Consider an individual who holds both debt and equity in equilibrium and
Am is therefore not constrained. For this investor, T1 =— , and(22) says
Bm
that taxes will lead him to concentrate his holdings more in those equities
1'- A which are safe 1 1 is large) if Tm > ,orthose which are risky
(- is small) if Tm< .Thosewith a tax preference for equity
wish to hold as much equity as possible for tax purposes. To do so
without incurring e]tcessive risk, they will tend to hold more of their
portfolio in low risk stocks. The opposite is true of individuals for
whom debt is superior for tax reasons. These investors will want to hold
as little equity as possible to obtain the "desired degree" of risk, and
will do so by holding small amounts of risky firms.
This result carries over to the general case where firm returns are
not independent. Figure 1 depicts the opportunity set of a typical
investor in terms of available combinations of mean m and standard
deviation, 0m The position of the efficient frontier of equity combina-
tions, labelled 2., depends on the equity tax rate tern.The available
riskless return is RWm(l_tm), and the corresponding optimal equity
portfolio is at point x. The investor will hold some combination of
this portfolio and riskless debt. An increase in the tax rate on interest—16—
Figure 1










income to tm changes the composition of the optimal portfolio to
at point y, where both mean and standard deviation are lower, but .k_
m a
and hence u
,ishigher than at point x. The shift of the investor's
(a2)m
tax preference toward equity caused by the increase in leads to a
safer equity portfolio. It is important to note that this alone does
not imply that the investor will bear less risk, because it says nothing
about the effect of the change in m on the allocation of wealth between
debt and equity.
One final observation to be made concerns the question of which
investors will be constrained in their portfolio decisions by the short-
sale and borrowing restrictions we have assumed to exist. As is evident
from (20), whether an individual is constrained in equity or debt depends
not only on his tax preference, but also on his degree of risk aversion,
as measured by y. Investors might be observed specialized in equity,
for example, who prefer debt for tax purposes but are nearly risk-neutral.
Thus, the knowledge of tax preferences alone will be insufficient to identify
the groups of investors who will specialize in either form of
security, and hence to determine the equilibrium aggregate debt-equity
ratio.—18—
5. objectives of the Fin
Thus far, we have concentrated on the behavior of individual investors
and the detenination of market equilibrium, taking as given the real and
financial decisions of fins. This section considers the question of how
fins should behave in their choice of financial policy.
In the absence of taxes, the ModiglianS-Miller Theorem dictates that
fin financial policy is irrelevant, having no effect on investor utilities
at all. This will not generally be true with taxes present, but there
may still exist conditions under which a fin's stockholders are unanimous
in their agreement that the fin should choose its debt-equity ratio to
maximize its total market value.
To explore this issue, we consider the effect on the utility of a
typical investor of an increase in the debt issued by firm k. First,
note that the expression for the mean return m, in (5), may be rewritten





Using (3), the definition of wm, and (13), we obtain
m=(l—tm)[R + nTc.+(rn-1)R'Et] (24)
Differentiation of Um(Pm, (am)2) with respect to Dk under the assumption
that fin k is too small to influence the market parameters R, A and B,
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Bycombining conditions (12) and (13), we are able to rewrite (25) as
d(Em) m
dUm
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equation(26) simplifies to
m m d(YET) m m
dU m ______ A mE- 1 TflB(AA)rflJ
(28)
(1)+(T —1) + =
u1Rcl-t;)[-
Am dDk Am B Em k
m m m m
From the definition of T ,Aand B ,itis clear that (TmB-1)=
Am
unless individual m is constrained. Moreover, if the constraint on short
m
sales of equity is in force, E. =0.Thus, the second term in brackets
1
i—20—
in (28) is non—zero only if 'E. =wm,and we may thus combine the first two
terms in (28) to obtain
=UTRU_t)Tm
—[(l - +(- )nJ
(29)
Note that with no taxes or binding constraints, this expression is uniformly
zero, in accordance with the Modigliani—Miller Theorem.
Expression (29) says that a firm's financial policy affects individual
utility in two ways. The first represents the wealth effect of a change
dvk in firm value (since —= 1-). Werethis the only term, all shareholders
dDk
would agree, on the objective of value maximization. As the following
argument demonstrates, the second term represents the effect of the firm's
debt policy on the opportunity set available to the investor. Suppose that
individual m plans to purchase a certain amount of equity in firm k, and
the firm increases its issuance of debt. To undo the effect of this decision,
the investor can purchase some of this debt, in the same proportion to his
equity in the firm as the total issue of debt has to the firm's equity. This
has two effects on the individual's welfare (aside from the wealth effect
discussed above). First, it raises the total cost of his holdings in the
dv,..m Am firm at a rate proportional to —nk
=(1-)nk
.Second,itchangesthe
form in which the firm's returns flow to the investor, switching a fraction
from debt to equity. In the absence of constraints, this would increase
taxes ata rate proportional to (Tml)n. With constraints, the "preference"
for equity is (see (12)), and this expression becomes (i- 1)n.Thus,
the loss to the investor involved in undoing the firm's leverage change in—21—
the way described is proportional to (1 --)n
+(1- - l)n=(— — -)n
which is the second term in brackets in expression (29). This term will
uniformly disappear only if the constraints Am on each investor m take on
values which make =
B
B
Suppose that this condition were satisfied, and that value maximization
would therefore be optimal. As we showed in section 3, value maximization
would lead to an interior equilibrium in which A=B. Hence Am=Bm. In turn,
this implies that investors who have a tax preference for equity (Tm>l) must
have xm<o and hence be specialized in equity, and investors with a tax prefer-
ence for debt (Tm<l) must have Am>O and be specialized in debt. This outcome
would lead to the equilibrium characterized by Miller (1977), in which all
investors are specialized in either debt or equity according to their tax
rates, each firm would be indifferent to its own debt-equity ratio, and the
corporate sector debt—equity ratio would equal the ratio of the wealth of
those investors with a tax preference for debt to the wealth of those investors
with a tax preference for equity.
Am A
The next step is to discover the conditions under which —= — .From mB
B
equation (19) we know that this can occur only if
either (1)F is of full rank; hence, F1 exists and investors hold the market
portfolio, with individual m holding a fraction of each firm's
equity,
or (2)F is not of full rank; there exists one firm which is perfectly
correlated in its underlying returns with some linear combination
of other firms.
It is easy to see that outcome (1) is impossible for the market as a whole.
It implies that =0for individuals specialized in debt, and since—22—
Em Am—= — byassumption, it follows that Am =0for all such individuals.
B A
This will be true only if 1m =coincidentally.
Thus, the segmented equilibrium in which value-maximization is
necessarily optimal can occur only if firms are small and there is a
redundant firm. Moreover, the existence of such a firm is also a sufficient
condition for such an equilibrium to obtain. This can be shown by examining
condition (18).It is easiest to imagine that there are two firms with
identical returns, although this is in no way restrictive. In this case,
the left—hand side of (18) is the same for each firm. For the right-hand
Am A sides to be equal also requires that —= —, assumingthe debt levels of
EmB
the firms to be different. This has a straightforward explanation. Without
the existence of constraints, these firms would present the opportunity for
riskless tax arbitrage. By buying equity in the firm which is less highly
levered, and selling short the other firm's equity, each investor can create
a safe composite asset which is taxed at equity rates and costs 4)times
the cost of debt yielding the same gross return. Thus! by borrowing one
unit of debt and purchasingunits of this safe equity, investor m can
generate a safe return after—tax of R(l_tc) (1_tern) —R(1_tm)
=
R(1_tm)(Tm_l).
Thus, if Tm >, investorm would engage in positive arnounts of this trans-
action; conversely, for Tm <, thearbitrage could be accomplished by
selling the safe equity short to purchase debt. The presence of constraints
prevents these transactions from occurring without bound, but all investors
will engage in them until a constraint is reached, unless Tm =andthey
are indifferent. This is because any interior position can be improved upon—23—
by simply trading one safe asset for another without in any way affecting
the portfolio's risk characteristics. Further, because this arbitrage
incurs no other costs, the shadow price of the constraint which prevents
it must fully offset its arbitrage value; that is, must equal
Bm B
The "Miller Equilibrium" thus requires that there exist a perfect
equity substitute for debt. In a more general model, with debt being risky
due to bankruptcy or other causes, the corresponding requirement would be
that there exist an equity substitute for each form of debt. This makes
clearer why the segmented equilibrium so resembles the outcome when there
is no risk at all or individuals are risk—neutral: each investor's decision
is now decomposable into two parts-—first, decide on the optimal portfolio,
then decide how it shall be taxed.
One final point to be made here concerns the exact form of the constraints
chosen. It is essential to recognize the importance of the symmetry between
the restrictions on borrowing and those on short sales. Had we instead
imposed restrictions on short sales of individual firms, as might seem more
plausible, it is clear that even a singular variance—covariance matrix for the
underlying returns is not sufficient to ensure that value maximization (and
hence a segmented equilibrium) is optimal. This is because the argument we used
above to show sufficiency required the investors to engage in short sales of
the equity of some firms.11 When the constraints are imposed on short sales of
individual firms' equity, the conditions for value maximization become more
stringent. The basic condition is that investors must be able to obtain their
Problems would arise also if the tax treatment of short sales were not
the mirror image of the treatment of positive holdings.— 24—
desiredpattern of returns across states of the world in whichever form is
preferred for tax purposes, debt or equity. If holdings of each security must
be nonnegative, then in general we require not just that the set of underlying
returns to firms span all states of the world (and that each firm is small),
but that the returns to equity and the returns to debt both span all possible
states. Essentially, this means that for each "real" firm there are two firms
identical in all respects, except that one is all equity and the other all
debt.
Since this is a stringent requirement, it is clear that the plausibility
both of the equilibrium described by Miller and of the assumption of value
maximization depends a great deal on which constraints are thought to be relevant.—25—
6. portfolio Behavior of Pension Funds
In the model explored above the factor which determined whether or not an
equilibrium existed for an interior value of the corporate sector debt-equity
ratio was the absolute tax advantage of different securities for different
investors. In this model if all investors have an absolute tax preference for
debt, say, the aggregate debt—equity ratio is infinite. We may now extend the
model to the case where an investor's overall portfolio consists of two separate
funds taxed at different rates. In this case the equilibrium depends upon
comparative tax advantages. The obvious example here is an investor who holds
a certain fraction of his wealth directly on his own account, and the remainder
is invested on his behalf in a pension fund which is tax-exempt. Even if the
investor has an absolute tax preference for debt, if his personal tax rate is
positive he will have a comparative advantage in equity.
Consider, first, the case of a defined contribution pension plan so that
the prospective pension depends entirely on the performance of the fund. Then
the investor will be concerned solely with the performance of the total portfolio
consisting of the securities owned on his own account and those owned by the
pension fund. Suppose, further, that the relative sizes of the two accounts
are fixed exogenously (by law, say, which limits the size of contributions to a
tax-exempt fund). There exists the possibility of infinite arbitrage between the
two accounts to exploit the comparative tax advantages of the two accounts. No
equilibrium exists unless constraints are imposed. Assume that constraints are
imposed on short sales (of both equity and debt) as in our previous model.
Then it is trivial to show that the optimal portfolio is to let the pension
fund own the debt which the investor wishes to hold and to purchase equity on—26—
his own account.12 If the relative amounts of debt and equity which he wishes
to own are exactly equal to the fixed relative wealths of the two accounts,
then both investors on their own account and pension funds will be completely
specialized. In general, however, one of the accounts will be specialized and
the other will contain both debt and equity)3 If there are no constraints on
borrowing, but only on short sales of equity then pension funds will always be
all—debt. This is because if a pension fund contained some equity, the indivi-
dual investor would prefer to switch the equity from the fund to his own account,
borrowing to finance the purchase. His liability on the loan would be offset
by the extra holding of debt which the fund would purchase out of the proceeds
of selling the equity. The capital structure of the total portfolio would be
unaffected by the switch but the tax burden on the returns would be less. Again
we see the critical role played by constraints. Some constraints are necessary
for existence; constraints only on short sales of equity lead to pension funds
being completely specialized in debt; constraints on short sales of both debt
and equity result in one of the accounts being specialized but, in general,
this may be either the pension fund (in debt) or the investor's own-account (in
equity). It is clear that if individuals do not face borrowing constraints we
would expect to find all investments in defined contribution pension plans
12The reader may easily see this from the appropriately revised formula-
tions of the budget set and first—order conditions in (5) ,(6),and (12).
the conditions required for firms to seek value maximization are
satisfied, then it is clear that pension and personal accounts will each
specialize in debt or equity according to their own absolute tax preferences.
Thus, the pension fund will always specialize in deb, and the individual will
hold only equity or only debt according to whether T is greater than or less
than one. This result is thus a special case of the general findings just
discussed.—27—
(such as TIAA-CREF, Keogh Plans or IRA's) in debt.14 Since discussion with our
colleagues suggests this is not the case, there is an interesting puzzle to
resolve about the investment strategy of pension funds.
So far we have assumed that the proportions of total wealth held directly
and in pension funds were given exogenously. If individuals are free to allocate
their wealth between the two accounts then, assuming that sufficient constraints
exist to ensure the existence of equilibrium, they will exploit the absolute
tax advantage of tax-exempt funds and put all their wealth in pension funds.
In practice, of course, our two—period model does not capture the fact that pen-
sion wealth is tied up until retirement and there will be an upper limit on the
proportion of wealth investors choose to put into such funds.
The above argument refers to tax—exempt funds from which the investor will
benefit directly. But many pension plans are defined benefit plans, and the
performance of the fund affects not prospective pension recipients but the
owners of the liability to pay future pensions, usually stockholders of the
company offering the pension plan. In this case, the analogue with our previous
model is that the company decides how much to put into its pension fund (the
degree of funding) and the portfolio strategy of the fund and on its own account
(i.e., its own debt-equity ratio). Exactly the same arguments as we used before
apply here, the only difference being that the investor is now the company and
the portfolio consists of the assets of the company and its unfunded pension
liability (which is equal to gross pension liabilities less the assets of the
pension fund). This case has been discussed by Black (1980) and Tepper (1980).
14Assuming that interest payments on personal borrowing are tax—deductible.—28—
The comparative tax advantage is that the company swuld hold equity while the
pension fund should hold debt. If the pension fund holds equity the company
would prefer the fund to sell the equity and purchase debt. This would reduce
the implicit riskiness of the unfunded liability thus allowing the company to
issue more debt on its own account leaving the capital structire of the company
(including unfunded liabilities) unchangtl. The tax saving from issuing more
debt is a pure arbitrage profit. Clearly, constraints on short sales of equity
by the pension fund are necessary for existence of an equilibrium and since
companies are allowed to borrow the resulting equilibrium is one in which pension
funds are completely specialized in debt. This result for defined benefit
plans is exactly analogous to the case of defined contribution plans discussed
above. The absolute tax advantage would suggest that, ceteris paribus, compan-
ies would choose to fully fund their pension schemes.—29—
7. conclusions
We have shown that in a world in which investors face different tax rates,
no equilibrium exists unless constraints are imposed. The exact nature of those
constraints will have a critical bearing on the nature of the equilibrium and
should therefore be modelled explicitly. In section 5 we showed that, given
certain conditions on the securities available in the market, investors will
be unanimous in supporting value maximization and firms will be indifferent as
to their choice of debt—equity ratio. When this is the case the equilibrium
will be segmented, investors will be completely specialized, and the aggregate
debt-equity ratio will equal the ratio of the wealth of those who, for tax
reasons, prefer debt to the wealth of those who prefer equity. But when the
conditions do not hold, value maximization is no longer the unambiguous objec-
tive of the firm, and investors will in general hold both debt and equity. It
is difficult to reconcile value maximization with the existence of portfolios
which contain both debt and equity.
Finally, we may note that for the Modigliani—Miller Theorem to hold in a
world without taxes, short sales of debt and equity must be allowed, whereas,
once we allow for taxes, constraints are essential for an equilibrium to exist
and indeed it is the constraints which enable an equilibrium to be reached in
which firms are indifferent as to their choice of debt-equity ratio.—30—
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